Gnoseology of Democracy and Modernity. The Issue at Sake of the Transcendence of the Western European Enlightenment

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The transition of the Western World from the despotic to the anthropocentric cosmosystem, combined with the mutation of the aforementioned, from the small to the large scale, brought the issue of democracy imperatively at the foreground. But, at the same time, democracy, as a concept, acquired an unprecedented ambiguity, as a result of its ideological prenotation and of the gnoseological deficit of modern science.

In the following pages I shall try to decode this adventure of democracy, and to verge on this concept in the light of the cosmosystemic gnoseology: firstly, I shall ascertain the problematic relation between modernity and the gnoseology of democracy. Secondly, I shall emphasize its aim. Thirdly, I shall outline its system, which is intended to realize its aim. Fourthly, I shall record the the counterpoint of democracy, as opposed to the other states pertaining to the anthropocentric cosmosystem, and finally I shall point out the time and the space (the when and the where) of democracy in the anthropocentric "biology".

1. The gnoseological shallowness and the proto-anthropocentric nature of modernity
The fundamental question, which has to be confronted by our age according to my opinion, is how to constitute a system of knowledge which shall not plainly function for stating the obvious, just capturing the phenomena under observation, or even preciding the present as a global value, and its realities as measure, that is as a standard for the understanding or the interpretation of the past, and furthermore, it shall not remain bound to the view that the future shall be related to the experienced cosmosystemic order.

Gnoseology has to propose a universal system of knowledge, which derives its material from the totality of cosmohistory, drills its material from the whole corpus of cosmohistory, ascribes the phenomena in terms of genera, of their typology, and of their evolutionary becoming, according to the cosmosystemic biology of the social man. Cosmosystemic gnoseology aspires to answer to this undertaking.

2 This paper is based on the G. Contogeorgis, Greek cosmosystem, Sideris Publications, Athens 2006 (in Greek); Democracy as freedom, Democracy and representation, Patakis Publications, Athens 2007 (in Greek); and Economic systems and freedom, Sideris Publications, Athens, 2010 (in Greek).
3 The cosmosystemic gnoseology introduces the distinction between cosmohistory and cosmosystemic history, in order to approach the social phenomenon according to the class of its constitution, that is of its individuality, and of its evolutionary semiology. The concept of the cosmosystem defines a set of societies with common fundamental parameters, institutional, ideological, and value defining concepts, which comprise a whole moving within historical time under the terms of inner self-sufficiency and of evolutionary coherence. We distinguish between the existences of two cosmosystemic paradigms: the despotic and the anthropocentric. The
Within the mentioned framework we shall concentrate specifically on the gnoseological issue, which is reduced to the concept of democracy, in order, firstly to ascertain if this civil imperative, and concomitantly the politic system processed by modernity, by the western european Renaissance and by Enlightenment, and constitutes the fundamental acceptance in our days, is recorded within democracy. If we agree that this is indeed taxinomized under the democratic states, something essentially accepted by all the thinkers of modern science and by the leading class, this means that there is no need to continue the dialog, but to act according to the current teaching: to take as a fact that the current system is democracy, and to continue by describing its constitutions. The parliament, the government, the parties, the groups of interest, the voting rights, the freedom of speech, and all the other various institutions, values and practices we experience in our everyday life.

On the other hand, it is evident that this choice is a scientific deadlock, since it bypasses the desideratum, the gnoseology of the phenomenon, in order to taxinomize by decision into democracy the state experienced by modernity, and even to evaluate it as superior to the democracy of the City-State, which produced this concept. A further result of this choice is the assertion that any objection to the current civil reality is subject to collaboration to authoritarianism, to the authoritative political system. One has to choose among the one or the other.

This approach obviously does not consider that our age is recorded typologically in a phase, which is based on the axiom of uniform thought and action, of the one and unique proposal for a state, independently of its morphological differentiations. I refer to the proto-anthropocentric period of the new world, which was brought to the surface by its exit from feudalism/despotism. However, modernity allows to reveal that its paradigm is unique and essentially irrevocable, according to the concept of the anthropocentric integration, therefore the perspective of evolution does not concur, of the mutation of the present towards a typologically different state. It is ready to accept the possibility of some morphological adaptations, which, on the other hand, shall not change the essence of modern democracy.

This attitude is ideologically conservative and gnoseologically unsustainable, since it denies the evolutionary nature of the social man, and specifically of the anthropocentric society. This approach of the evolutionary becoming of the social man is yet combined with the fact that modernity has not succeeded up to our age to develop any reliable problematic about the evolution for exceeding the statutory foundations of the present. This becomes evident when we approach the concepts concordant with the social man, and hereto these escorting the concept of democracy, such as freedom, equality, justice, the civil rights, the right of participation in the state, etc. All these concepts, as exactly the concept of democracy, have a binding, concrete content and essentially describe the realities experienced by the world in our days, which are projected as a global gnoseological issue at stake.

In order to understand the cause of this phenomenon we have to return to the period of the entrance of the western european feudal world into modernity. The contact of this period with the concept of democracy did not originate from the condition that is of reality, in or-

despotic produces societies of “subjects” under the property of someone else, the anthropocentric societies signed by freedom. The anthropocentric cosmosystem is distinguished into two major periods: the one of the small scale, when the hellenisism is being embodied, and to the other of the large scale, which is rendered by modern age. The anthropocentric cosmosystem of small scale has to demonstrate an integrated evolutionary course, something essential for the study of the social phenomenon, whereas the age of the large cosmosystemic scale is typologised simply as proto-anthropocentric. More about this issue in the works of the author, especially in Con
der for the thinkers to draw from reality its content, and to be led sequentially to a definition describing the experienced state. The modern world discovered democracy, was informed about its existence, along the way towards the anthropocentric transition, through the readings of the hellenic literature.

Precisely because of this, the thinkers could not understand the issue at stake, conceive the content of its institutional armory, or being capable to taking into account its time of appearance. On the other hand, simultaneously with the non-occurring assistance of the intellectual prerequisites for the understanding the concept of democracy, the conditions for its acceptance as a pragmatological issue at stake, and for its implementation, did also not concur. Indeed, the priorities of the epoch of transition from the despotic to the anthropocentric system raised unequivocally the issue of the freedom of the individual that is of the abdication of the bonds of the feudal society upon the individual. However, this freedom does not object to the belonging of the state on the property of someone else such as in the authoritative state, or the nation state, - obviously not to the belonging of the system of economy to the property, differentiated by society or its partial factors (of the entrepreneur, or of the investor, or of the state).

The case of the thinkers of Enlightenment is superbly characteristic of the fact that through their weakness to approach the essence, the institutions and the time of democracy, as well as of the related concepts, such as freedom, arrived to the construction of the ideology of modernity, which was comprised by the "substantiation» of the democratic taxonomy of the state they intended, for the period after the overthrow of despotism. In their environment it was natural for the thinking man of the age of transition to depart from the initial admiration of “antiquity” and, within this context, of democracy, in order to provide answers to the burning issues he had to confront: how to constitute, the new to him, anthropocentric society, with only sign the individual freedom: how to harmonize the socio-economic and political system in virtue of belonging to property within the environment of the anthropocentric society: lastly, how to legitimate the rejection of democracy of the state, that is of the city-state, but also of the city/public of that age-, without ascribing to the incubating political morphome the accusation of oligarchy: being its aim, and many other issues.

Through complicated noetic processes and institutional inventions, which dominate even in our days the, anyway inevitable, civil (economic, social and political) system of the first post-feudal age of the democracies was finally achieved. On the other hand, and in the light of the cosmosystemic gnoseology, this pertains paradigmatically to the strict oligarchical states, having as its sign the elected monarchy.

However, what is very interesting in our days is that the dialog about democracy, and about the relevant concepts, is still pursued according to the terms of Enlightenment. Indeed, when we realize by naked eye that everything occurring in our days connote that we experience not an internal crisis of the proto-anthropocentric period, but a phase change. This necessitates the change of the value paradigm and of the systemic paradigm.

2. The aim of democracy

Democracy is not an objective in itself. It is the state which is called to realize the scope of the anthropocentric society, which is of freedom. Hereto, the freedom of democracy covers the whole of the social life of man. Stating this schematically, we would say that democracy is called to institutionalize the social domain in such a manner, so that the freedom of its mem-
bers, in the fields of the atomic/personal, socio-economic and political life, is being materialized.

This assumption necessitates the clarification of a series of issues: firstly, the concept of freedom is defined as autonomy; that is, it enrolls in its content the self-defining premise of the individual as referring to its personal or private life, as well as within the socio-political sphere. The principle of autonomy is being ascribed with the provision «μη ἀρχεσθαι υπὸ μη-δενός» (do not be governed by anybody). The individual freedom introduces the issue of autonomy into the personal life of each and every member in society. Social freedom refers to the fields of social life, where the individual enters into contracts, such as with the economic (sub-) systems. Political freedom is deduced to the place of the individual member of the society to the whole that is to the relation between society and politics.

So, the general (individual, social, political) freedom suggests that the state as a whole - the economic, social and political system - is obliged to ensure autonomy, that is the non-dependence of the individual by anyone, regarding all the fields of the sphere of knowledge. In order for this to be achieved, the individual has either to participate alike to the administration of the system, or not to be subject to their dependence. The choice of the one or of the other solution depends essentially on the anthropocentric time. This means, for example in the field of economy that the system finds so that it does not enroll the citizen into the semiology of the dependence of the body of labor, or, in another version, to determine him as a partner within the system. In the field of politics freedom presupposes the embodiment of the whole of the system by the body of the society of citizens, instead of the state.

This detection raises the issue of the place of property in democracy. Indeed, democracy does not oppose property. On the contrary. However, it distinguishes between individual properties; in the cases this does not imply the creation of contracts with someone else, here-to with the citizen, and the property, which is amenable to cancel freedom. The most characteristic of these contracts refer to the fields of the economic and political system.

Another entirely ideological parameter featured by modernity, in order to prove by it the experience of the global freedom, concerns the concept of consent. Consent was featured as argument, obviously in order to dispel the fact that the preservation, within the conditions of the individual anthropocentrism, of the earlier proprietorially ordered status in their systems, it functioned abjuratory to the (social and political) freedom. However, it is being neglected that consent, in this case, is the contributor of legalization, but not of freedom. The consenting person does not remain free just because he accepts its submission to a status of dependence that is of heteronomy.

In order to cure completely this assertion, freedom within the social and the political field shall be defined in accordance with the concept of right instead of autonomy. This fact is not only inconsistent with the approach of the individual freedom, which is conducted in the light of autonomy. It raises the right as superior to freedom, just as it delimits extensively the field of the individual freedom or the frame of its protection, where the individual lacks of freedom. Typical examples are, in our times, the work area, or the relation between society and politics. So, modernity, by defining the social and the political freedom in terms of right, avoids stipulating their non-existence, in order to enroll in its system the democratic states.

An inevitable conclusion of this ideological palinode is the assertion of the science of modernity, that the individual freedom is incompatible with political freedom (the homolo-

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gous equality, etc.), which on the other hand is identified with the alleged body of collegiality, that is of the state/system. On the very opposite, the cosmosystemic gnoseology suggests that freedom is undivided, and its fields of realization are added cumulatively, according to the following series: individual, social, political freedom. Stating this alternatively, it is not conceivable that someone pursues firstly the political freedom and then the individual freedom, or to be politically free without being individually sovereign. The biology of the societies follows in respect to this a pramatomatical and evolutionary logic, as exactly the biology of each and every person. The difference lies in the fact that, on the one hand the evolutionary biology of each man can be easily perceived, and on the other hand that social biology presupposes other processes of comprehension, which modern science stays away of their decoding by far.

The inability of modern science to approach democracy, and in extension, its aim, led to the declaration of its totalitarian character. On the other hand, this assertion does not consider the fact that totalitarianism, as well as absolutism and authoritarianism, asserts the existence of a concrete differentiation between the holder of a global political responsibility and its social subject that is the mutation of the former into a politically dominant power. In democracy the subject of political dominance - the society of the citizens - is absent, because the political freedom eliminates the relationship between the ordinate and the subordinate, since the political system is included entirely within the society of the citizens.

In conclusion, the aim of democracy refers to global freedom that is cumulatively to the individual social and political freedom. The global freedom of any form is being delimited in the light of the autonomy of the members of the social body within the individual, socio-economic and political field.

3. The state or the social-economic and political system of democracy

The aim of the general freedom can be achieved only within a democratic state. This state is called to realize the field of freedom beyond the field of the individual, within the fields of the economo-social and of the political system. The individual existentialization of man can be complemented also within an institutional system that accepts the belonging of the system in the (differentiated) property, and thus escapes from the society of the citizens. It is enough for the holder of the system to take into account to its polices the established right of the individual freedom, that is of the constitutional, of the value, and of other welfares, ensuring it, and a redistribution of wealth capable of supporting it.

In reality, this issue at stake is under the condition of the preservation of a sensitive equilibrium between the society of the citizens and the body of the system, whereas the policies of the latter are being embodied by relationships of power, which are developed within the frame of social dynamics. Society remains a private, and encounters, or is in discourse, with the body of the system, exceeding it, on a extra-institutional basis.

In order for this social freedom to be achievable, a system has to be invented, which shall not place in an authoritarian (conventional or not) dependence the individual-member of society. How can this be accomplished? As regards, for instance, the economic field, we can suppose two possibilities: according to the first, the individual disconnects from the process of production, or acquires its own proprietorial surface according to the second; it can enter into the system as its component. The more comprehensive pursuit with this issue is unnecessary, since it refers to a dialogue, for which modern science is not prepared. In that case, it is enough to recall the Greek anthropocentric paradigm of the City-State, just to make a predis-
position: in the state-centered epoch of democracy the resolution of the issue of social freedom was accomplished by the disposal of the citizen from the economic process (the case of the leisure society). In the ecumenical phase of the anthropocentric cosmosystem social freedom was accomplished by the corporate organization of the economic system.

The political freedom, from its side, can be achieved by one and only way: by the embodiment of the political system by the body of the society of the citizens. In order for this to happen two things are required. The constitution of the society to demos, that is to the organic component of the political system, and, at the same time, the receipt of the global political jurisdiction to demos. Because only by the global embodiment of the state by society, the individual/citizen is being released from the political custody, and, in every case, from the any “contracts” of dependence.

By this way the transition from the state of the politically dominant power to the non-authoritative ordered global political responsibility of the society-demos is being realized. From this social collegiality, which incorporates and operates the state (its holders that is the nation of the state) to the social collegiality, which is defined as the tautological equivalent of the society of demos (the nation of society).

The disclaim of the division of the politicians and, obviously, as regards the social freedom, of the social projects is the prerequisite for the abolishment of authoritarian heteronomy. This indicates that the invocation, and indeed the application of this principle, is not subject to the principle of the other authority, which is invoked by the oligarchic ideology, of the so called complexity, but is related to the degree of the anthropocentric integration of the social man. The whole of the institutional environment of democracy is contained unaltered within the society-demos. The any executive authorities are just called to operate restrictive-ly, as if they were the handmaids, the polices of demos.

Lastly, it is clarified that the axiom of democracy –«το μη ἀρχεσθαι υπό μηδένος» (do not be governed by anybody)– does not equates this state with anarchy, since the latter does not comprise a state. Besides, its very existence is immediately related to the pre- or proto-anthropocentric age of the state of political dominance.

4. Democracy and the non-democratic states

These few notes regarding the democratic state establish the conditions of its institutional and of its value system versus the other anthropocentric states. I refer particularly to the representation, and fully incidentally to the pre-representational state.

Democracy is distinguished explicitly by representation. They both meet because of the fact that both of them presuppose the constitution of the society of citizens into an organic institution of the state that is to demos. But they differ, since on the one hand this attributes to society the global political responsibility, and on the other hand, representation attributes only the property of the contractor. In democracy the representative institutions function in the light of the treating subject of the state, in contrary to the representative state, which is characterized by the epimerization of the political responsibility between the agent and the intermediary. This difference is not just morphological, it contains the elements of a signifying typological conterpoint.

5 More, in Contogeorgis (2010).
As regards the pre-representative political system, hereto this of modernity, we ascertain that it does not contain any of the elements of representation, and evidently any of democracy. Society is being conceived as a private citizen, it does not constitute an institutional political category (demos), nor does it possess the slightest political responsibility. The state does not embody just the whole of the political system. It also annexes the concept of social collegiality (which is, in this case, attributed to the sign of the nation), since, only in this way it can sanction for exercising the political dominance on the society of the citizens, that is, simultaneously, the properties of the agent and of the principal.

By the abovementioned it can be inferred that the aim of democracy, the embodiment of the global, and especially of the political freedom, cannot be satisfied by the other two political systems. On the one hand, the representation appears as a transitory state which bridges the proto-anthropocentric age with the age of the anthropocentric integration. In particular, the proto-representation is just called to cure the individual freedom, and by small steps, with the passage of the proto-representational time, some social and political rights which delimit extensionally its content. Because of this, modern science, by persisting to taxinomize its state (its socio-economic and political system) to the democracies, and indeed, to ascertain that it is at the same time democratic and representative, where the representation and democracy constitute simultaneously two typologically different states, is being conceived just as gnoseologically deficient, and, by all means, prone to ideological prenotations of science.

5. The time of democracy

We have already ascertained that the global, and especially within this frame, the political freedom are being deduced to the age of the anthropocentric maturity of the social man. We have also noted that the order of the attendance of the social man at freedom is pre-described, that is, it precedes, by definition, the individual freedom, and then the social freedom and the political freedom follow.6

As we have seen, insofar as the order of the states follows the operative part of the growth of their aim, hereto of freedom, it is obvious that the time of democracy coincides with the one of anthropocentric maturity, that is of global freedom. For instance, it is inconceivable that a society, entering for the first time into anthropocentrism, existentializes towards its way to the phase of integration, as exactly each and every man cannot be born as a mature man in the age of sixty, and regressing to its infant age. This indisputable fact, seen with the naked eye, as refers to the individual, is generally difficult to be perceived when it comes about the social phenomenon, especially within the environment of the anthropocentric cosmosystem, since the latter is unique; it is biologized once as a typology, and not serially.

So, the objective weakness of modern science for conceiving the biology of the social phenomenon, does not suggest that this process does not concur as a phenomenon and as an evolutionary component. For the time being, we can overlook the submergence into this major issue at stake. However, it is enough to point out some related manifestations. The time of a state, and by extension, of democracy, is not connected to the noetic or gnoseologic func-

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6 However, it is conceived that the order of this anthropocentric evolution refers to the dynamics of the evolutionary protogenesis of the social man. Since, when this process shall be integrated, the interchange of states obeys on different causes, as well as in the cases where social entities of despotic type enter into the anthropocentric becoming.
tions of man. It is not enough for someone to grasp the concept of a particular state, in order for this to be implemented subsequently. I would say that the concept cannot be grasped without the concurrence of the necessary conditions, or, at least, of the noetic conditions leading to the capitalization of the historical experience. For instance, if the implementation of democracy is being attempted in our epoch, a different result shall emerge, as this exactly occurred in the case of the exit of Western Europe from the despotic cosmosystem. This also occurred during the transfer of the phenomenon of the commons/cities in Western Europe during the phase of Renaissance, where the escorting states adapted to their unprocessed anthropocentric synagoge. Those were the days when the anthropocentric enclaves of the fledgling Europe were convinced that they would reconstitute the incomparable to them “Antiquity”. Through this attempt the appropriate to the new conditions anthropocentric phenomenon was produced: the classicism in architecture, in music, in theater, etc. Analogous phenomena are met in economy, in politics, and generally in society, but because of lag in phase, the modern Western World was confronted to the pre-solonic proto-anthropocentric age of the hellenic world.

In such a way, we can explain not only the non-appearance of the democratic state in our days, but also the reason of why modern science cannot conceive it. Stating it differently, the issue at stake in our days ranges between the pre-representative state and its authoritarian deviation. Democracy does not concur, not because somebody deprives it from the societies, but because the demand does not concur, it is not even recorded as an issue at stake within the value system of the modern man, and even its pragmatological prerequisites also do not concur.

So that, by the abovementioned, the order of maturity, and in extension of the evolution of the states in the anthropocentric cosmosystem is the following: pre-representative, representative, democratic. The pre-representative is intended to conserve the simple individual freedom, without affecting the fundamental proprietal basis of the (economic and political) system. It just adapts it to the prescriptions of the proto-anthropocentric necessity, thus confining the property to things (the means of production, etc.), but not to the social man. Thus, the debarment of social and political freedom is called to be confirmed on the basis of contract that is of consent, and literally, not necessarily, of the explicit resignation from it. The proto-anthropocentric phase establishes the fundamental foundations of the new epoch, in the sense that, within this phase the parameters of the familiar cosmosystem are being developed.

In any case, the pre-representative state is clearly non representative. The alias which defines it just declares that this is recorded in a dynamics, which, in depth of time, shall lead to the representative state. As much as the parameters driving the anthropocentric evolution are being developed, the claim of the social man, in order to become disconnected from the slaveries/dependences staying in concord with the property over the system, is shaped, or even the entrance into it, in order to control it and to be liberated by the dependence. The representative state is being placed on the threshold between the proto-anthropocentric and the integrated anthropocentric age. The social man participates in the social and the political
freedom, but only in a small amount, until it transits to the final phase of the anthropocentric integration, the global freedom and concomitantly to democracy.\textsuperscript{7}

It is not necessary for the purpose of this approach to pursue the etiological basis of democracy. It is enough to note that the gradual entrance of the society of the citizens into the state corresponds analogously to the autonomy of the economic parameter from the social dominance and its development at the level of the cosmosystem. Thus, the initial civil claim of the society of the citizens is born as the result of the need for counterbalancing the increasing political power of the economic property. Which need, in the course of time, is mutated into an issue of freedom, into an imperative of life in itself. The same analogues hold also for social freedom, while its route shall be related to the more special aspects of the relation created between the body of labor and the body of the system of economy. But, both of them, social and political freedom, the very anthropocentric reality in its whole, obey to the parameter of the \textit{communicative system}. In the known anthropocentric world the communicative system was fundamentally related to the cosmosystemic scale. The small scale, as it refers especially to the hellenic/anthropocentric cosmosystem, and the large scale, as it refers to the large cosmosystemic scale of the nation state. The focus on the scale indeed covenants that, on the hand, this is significant in the extent it is the prerequisite for enrolling the social event into the anthropocentric becoming, and that, on the other hand, this is not exclusive. Without enlarging upon the documentation of this detection, I shall invoke the hellenic paradigm. The scale remained unaltered, from the cretan minoan age up to the classical age. But, democracy entered into the anthropocentric trajectory of the city only in the 5\textsuperscript{th} century, that is, when the parameters of existentializing and of moving the anthropocentric becoming in history, had matured.\textsuperscript{8} For the same reason, the absence of democracy, as well as of representation in our age, does not result from the large cosmosystemic scale, but because of the proto-anthropocentric phase experienced by the social man.

\textbf{6. The age of modernism and the perspective of democracy}

By the few abovementioned, it evidently results that our age experiences the proto-anthropocentric phase of the anthropocentric cosmosystem, hereto the conditions of the pre-representative state. Hereto, the claim of modern science, that the world of our age proceeded directly from the despotic period to the period of anthropocentric maturity, is confuted as unsustainable. Under this perspective, the persistence of modern science to typologize a paradigmatically proto-anthropocentric state, such as its political system, into democracy, is recorded in principle in its general weakness to distinguish between the cosmosystemic scale, which is obviously superior, and therefore generator of parameters (among them, the communicative and the economic) surpassing by far these of the small scale, and of the anthropocentric phase, which it undergoes. Thus, the concept of \textit{modernity} is explained, which should

\textsuperscript{7} In the present paper, the gnoseology of democracy is being examined exclusively within the environment of the state-centered phase. Therefore, the phase of the meta-state-centered phase is omitted, and therefore democracy in the frame of the cosmopolis/cosmostate.

\textsuperscript{8} Also the Pre-hellenes, as well as some asiatic people, had cities, but their anthropocentric evolution, and furthermore democracy, is being recorded as a phenomenon in the trajectory of the hellenic world, insofar as the societies of the cities were recorded in a purely cosmosystemic trajectory. The issue of scale is being examined thoroughly by Aristotle. But, as far as it results, the Greeks were completely conscious about its meaning for the anthropocentric existentialiation of the social man.
define the modern anthropocentric age, declaring at the end a purely ideological choice, which places the modern world in the scale of the anthropocentric integration and beyond, as a measure of evaluation of the past, and to the evolutionary “end” of the anthropocentric becoming. This exact combination between the ideological signature of our age with the gnoseological deficit, which is evident, also explains the reason of why the perspective of evolution is absolutely absent from modern science. Not just as a phase of the overall anthropocentric becoming, but also as a problematics for the solution of problems occurring in our days. Thus, it instructs that the solutions to the emerging problems have to be “deterministically” sought within the present system, and not beyond it. This fact becomes evident, if we take into account the obsession of modernity for neglecting the character of the developments taking place progressively from the decade of 1980s, with the planetary development of the fundamental parameters of the anthropocentric cosmosystem and concomitantly, the radical overturn of the balance between society, economy and politics.

Thus, the question returns to the source of our problematics. And yet, do we have to conclude that the transition into the late cosmosystemic scale signs negatively the perspective of the transition into democracy? The answer, according to modern science, is all the more positive, since it contests for its documentation not only the argument of scale and of complexity, but also of the pre-modern character of “hellenic” democracy.

On the very opposite, cosmosystemic gnoseology instructs that our age has entered into a cosmosystematically ordered anthropocentric trajectory, which in itself prejudges its evolutionary semiology. The difference in scale, in relation to its anthropocentric uterus, the hellenic cosmosystem, does not cancel its issue at stake. It just states that during the course for its integration it shall be called to pursue different solutions, that is, throught the teleological embodiment.

In the light of this fact, that is, that our age is taxinomized in the proto-anthropocentric phase of the social becoming, justifies patently the pre-representational character of the political system, as well as the non-based on the principle of social freedom constitution of the economic system, that is the relation of the body of labour with it. This reality, and especially the developments recorded from the decade of the 1980s, incline the begin of a new period, during which the fundamental anthropocentric parameters (economy, communication, etc.) have been already signed into the future, with their development beyond the state, on the level of the whole, henceforth planetary cosmosystem. The fact that the (economic, social and political) system continues remaining captive to the past of the age of Enlightenment does not cancel the dynamic of the phenomenon. It just confirms the succesion of the shift of the anthropocentric environment along its way towards integration, in line with the interrelationships.

The gnoseological testimony of this evolution can be drawn from the already occured hellenic anthropocentric paradigm. The analogy in the comparison, which is urged by the difference of the cosmosystemic scale, leads us after all into the ascertainment that the progressive development of the anthropocentric parameters leads societies to claim their entrance into the state, in order to counterbalance their socio-economic and political weakness. At the same time, the basis of the analogy is being designated. For instance, the comparison between the economic parameter of the large to the small cosmosystemic scale, has to be accomplished not in quantitative terms, as the modern science accomplishes (such as by distinguishing between the “industrial” economy and the economy of “craft production”), but in the light of the producing result on the familiar social environment. We shall ascertain that the economy of
our age produces a socio-economic and political result corresponding to that close to the epoch of Solon. But, it does not touch the representative state introduced by Solon, and obviously, not of democracy. Similar identifications can be mentioned regarding the communicative parameter.

By the abovementioned it results that formulations such as direct and indirect democracy, representative democracy, participatory democracy; and other, contain profoundly the ideological request and the gnoseological deficit of modernity, but do not attribute by themselves the true nature of the state of our age. Similarly, the explicit suppression of the fact that the social and political aspect of freedom is defined in the light of the eteronomic right, and not of autonomy.

From this point of view, the need for modern science for being relieved of the ideological ankyloses of the transitory age, and hereto of Enlightenment, in order to disclaim its certainties, and to enter into the phase of the constitution of a novel gnoseology with cosmosystemic assertion, is proved to be urgent. This issue refers to the concepts, the typology and the time of the social event, as well as to the self-reflection of cosmohistory. Besides, we estimate that this self-reflection of cosmohistory through the cosmosystemic point of view of the social man, shall lead to the recovery of the past in the form of a paradigm, so that its evaluation shall yield to science invaluable information for the attempt of the constitution of a novel, global, that is a cosmosystemic, regarding its issue at stake, gnoseology.